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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This survey marks the fourteenth year the author has surveyed
Eleventh Circuit evidence decisions. During these years there has been,
in the author's opinion, an unmistakable trend-a trend that continued
during the current survey period. In stark contrast to the days when the
Eleventh Circuit rigorously examined district court evidentiary decisions
and freely reversed those decisions, the Eleventh Circuit now carefully
defers to district judges. The abuse-of-discretion standard that has
always governed evidentiary issues on appeal now seems to be the
standard of review in practice as well as in name.
Absent some action by Congress, the most extensive changes to the
Federal Rules of Evidence in recent years will become effective December
1, 2000. A summary and brief discussion of the amendments follow.
The full text of the new Rules and the Advisory Committee notes can be
found at the website of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts.'
An amendment to Rule 1032 may provide needed clarity to the
circumstances that require a party to renew an objection or to make an
additional offer of proof after a court has previously ruled on an
evidentiary matter. The new rule will provide that "[o]nce the court
makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence,
either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer a
proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal."3 Thus, if a court grants

* Partner in the firm of Adams, Jordan & Treadwell, P.C., Macon, Georgia. Valdosta
State University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D.,
cum laude, 1981). Member, State Bar of Georgia.

1. See The Federal Judiciary Homepage (visited Feb. 21, 2000) <http'J/www.uscourts.gov/rules/propevid.pdf>.
2. FED. R. EvID. 103.
3.

PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 103.
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a motion in limine to exclude evidence, and assuming that the party
wishing to propound the evidence made an adequate offer of proof, that
party need not make a further offer of proof at trial. Similarly, if the
trial court denies the motion in limine and rules that the evidence will
be admissible at trial, the party seeking to exclude that evidence need
not object at trial when the evidence is tendered. The same is true of
"continuing objections" during trial; they are no longer necessary.
However, the new rule has both an express and, it would seem, an
implicit limitation. The express limitation is that the ruling must be
"definitive."4 Thus, if the trial court's ruling is conditional or equivocal,
further action would be required when the evidence is tendered. The
implicit limitation is that the circumstances existing at the time of the
initial ruling must also exist when the issue arises again. For example,
the district court may, based upon the facts established at the time of its
ruling on a motion in limine, deny the motion. When the issue arises
again at trial, the record may contain additional facts relevant to the
issue. Similarly, a ruling excluding evidence may be entirely correct
based on the facts then known to the district court, but incorrect based
on further facts developed at trial. In either event, it would seem that
the party should renew his objection or make another offer of proof based
on the changed circumstances or additional facts.
Current Rule 404(a)(2) permits a defendant to offer evidence of a
pertinent trait of character of his alleged victim.5 The proposed
amendment to Rule 404(a)(2) would allow the prosecution to tender
evidence of a homicide victim's character trait of peacefulness to rebut
a defendant's contention that the alleged victim was the aggressor.6
This change to Rule 404(a)(2) is substantially narrower than the
amendment initially proposed, which would have allowed the prosecution
to tender rebuttal evidence to any evidence of a victim's character
tendered by the defense.7
As discussed in this survey and several prior surveys, the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Daubert v. United States' has had a
profound impact on the scope of admissible expert testimony. Since
Daubert district courts and courts of appeals have struggled to come to
terms with the district courts' new gatekeeper role in determining the
admissibility of expert testimony. Daubert has now inspired proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence.

4. Id.
5. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
6. PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).

7. Id.
8.

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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Rule 701 currently addresses the scope of opinion testimony by lay
witnesses.9 Amended Rule 701 will make clear that lay witnesses
cannot give opinion testimony based on "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. "1 ° In other words,
the reliability requirements imposed by Daubert on expert testimony
cannot be avoided by labeling the witness a lay witness.
The proposed amendment to Rule 702 basically codifies Daubert and
requires that expert testimony must be based upon sufficient facts or
data, must be the product of reliable principles and methods, and those
principles and methods must be applied reliably to the facts of the
case."
Rule 703 allows an expert to base opinions on facts or data not
admitted in evidence if the facts or data are "of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field. " 12 The proposed amendment to
Rule 703 provides that such facts or data, although relied upon by the
expert, cannot be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the testimony
unless the court determines that the probative value of the facts or data
in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.'"
The business records exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 803(6),'14 will
be amended to allow the foundational requirements of the exception to
be established "by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule
902(12), or a statute permitting certification," rather than by a "live"
Thus, it would not be necessary to bring the records
witness.'"
custodian into the courtroom to establish that the documents satisfy the
requirements of the business records exception. To complement this
amendment, subdivisions 11 and 12 will be added to Rule 902, the Rule
providing the means of self-authentication. 6 Rule 902(11) will permit
a records custodian to certify that domestic documents meet the
requirements of Rule 803(6). 17 Rule 902(12) does the same for foreign
records.' 8

9.
10.

FED. R. EvID. 701.
PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 701.

11.

PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 702.

12.

FED. R. EVID. 703.

13. PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 703.
14. FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
15.
16.
17.
18.

PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
FED. R. EVID. 902.
PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 902(11).
PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 902(12).
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PROVISIONS

Rule 101 provides that the Federal Rules of Evidence "govern
proceedings in the courts of the United States." 19 Notwithstanding this
seemingly clear statement, however, the precise application of the Rules
can be problematic.2 ° In diversity cases, state law provides the
substantive rule of decision, but procedural issues, such as the admission
of evidence, are determined by federal law. However, there are some
exceptions to this general rule. For example, Rules 302, 501, and 601
provide express exceptions for presumptions of fact in civil actions,
privileges, and competency of witnesses. 2' These Rules provide that if
state law governs the substantive issues, then state evidentiary rules
will govern those evidentiary issues. In addition to these express
exceptions, there are judicially created exceptions to the general
applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence. For example, some state
evidentiary rules may embody a matter of state substantive policy. In
that event, the state evidentiary rule is often applied. For example, in
Gardener v. Chrysler Corp.,22 the Tenth Circuit held that a state law
prohibiting the admission of evidence of failure to use a seatbelt is not
simply a rule of evidence that "we could then ignore," but rather is a
statement of substantive law "'concerned with the channeling of
behavior outside the courtroom, and where as in this case the behavior
in question is regulated by state law rather than by federal law, state
23
law should govern even if the case happens to be in federal court.'"
This apparently is the case in the Eleventh Circuit because, during the
24
current survey, the Eleventh Circuit in Whitley v. United States
affirmed a district court's application of a Georgia statute2 5 deeming
the failure to wear a seatbelt irrelevant.26
Also during the survey period, the effect of state rules on the
admission of evidence in federal courts arose in a federal criminal trial.
In United States v. Lowery,27 defendant contended that the trial court
should have suppressed the testimony of his alleged coconspirator
because that testimony was based on plea bargain agreements between

19.

FED. R. EVID. 101.

20. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 48 MERCER L. REV.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

1607, 1608-10 (1997).

FED. R. EviD. 302, 501, 601.
89 F.3d 729 (10th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 736 (quoting Barron v. Ford Motor Co., 965 F.2d 195, 199 (7th Cir. 1992)).
170 F.3d 1061 (11th Cir. 1999).
O.C.G.A. §.40-8-76.1 (Supp. 2000).
170 F.3d at 1078-79.
166 F.3d 1119 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 212 (1999).
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the coconspirator and the prosecution.2" Defendant argued that Rule
4-3.4(b) of the Florida Bar Rules of Professional Conduct, which forbids
lawyers from "'offer[ing] an inducement to a witness,'" rendered the plea
agreements inadmissible.29 The district court agreed and suppressed
the statements. 30 Although the district court's local rules incorporated
the Florida Bar Rules, and Congress, since the district court's opinion,
had by statute provided that government prosecutors are subject to state
bar organization rules, the Eleventh Circuit nevertheless held that the
Florida Bar Rule did not bar the admission of the codefendant's
testimony.3' The admissibility of evidence in federal courts, the
Eleventh Circuit held, is a matter entirely of federal law: "State rules
of professional conduct, or state
rules on any subject, cannot trump the
32
Federal Rules of Evidence."
To reach this conclusion, the court took an interesting route. The
court noted that Rule 402 provides that all relevant evidence is
admissible, "'except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States, by act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
33
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.'"
This, the court held, was "an exclusive list of the sources of authority for
exclusion of evidence in federal court." 4 Because state rules of
professional conduct are not listed in Rule 402, the court determined
they cannot bar the admission of evidence in federal court.3 5 Similarly,

because local rules of federal courts are not listed in Rule 402, they also
cannot bar the admission of otherwise admissible evidence. 8 Finally,
the court reasoned, Congress's decision to subject United States
Attorneys to local bar rules was not aimed at the admission of evidence. 7 Clearly, the court concluded, Congress did not intend to give
states and state bar organizations the authority to determine the

28. 166 F.3d at 1121-22. This issue had its genesis in the once famous, now infamous,
decision of a Tenth Circuit panel holding that plea agreements violated federal law
prohibiting the bribing of witnesses. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 134452 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371
(1999). In Lowery the Eleventh Circuit joined the rush of circuits rejecting the panel's
holding that plea agreements constituted bribery. 166 F.3d at 1124.
29. 166 F.3d at 1124 (quoting FLA. BAR RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 4-3.4(b)).
30. Id. at 1121-22.
31. Id. at 1124 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 530B (Supp. IV 1998)).
32. Id. at 1125.
33. Id. (quoting FED. R. EvID. 402).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.

1170

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

admissibility of evidence in federal court.3 8 Accordingly, the court
reversed the
district court's decision suppressing the codefendant's
39
testimony.
Rule 106, known as the rule of completeness, provides that if a party
introduces a portion of a document or recorded statement, the opposing
party may require the introduction of any other part of the document or
the recorded statement "which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it."4 ° In Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,"' the
Eleventh Circuit held that Rule 106 is not limited to situations in which
a party has actually introduced a portion of a document or recorded
statement.42 Acknowledging that Rule 106 is "technically" limited to
such situations, the court concluded that if a party has examined a
witness about a document to the extent that the examination is
"tantamount" to the introduction of the document into evidence, then
Rule 106 is applicable.4
During the current survey period, the court returned to the issue of
when examination of a witness about a document or a recorded
statement is "tantamount" to the introduction of the document or
recorded statement and thus implicates Rule 106. In United States v.
Ramirez-Perez," the prosecutor attempted to admit defendant's signed
statement into evidence. However, because the statement implicated a
codefendant, that codefendant moved to redact a portion of the statement. Defendant argued that if a redacted statement were tendered by
the government, he should be allowed, pursuant to Rule 106, to
introduce any other part of the statement that tended to exculpate him.
The trial court agreed. To avoid this dilemma, the prosecutor, rather
than tendering the written statement, proceeded to examine the agent
who interrogated defendant about what defendant said. Thus, although
the prosecutor did not tender the statement, he elicited from the agent
statements made by defendant that were later memorialized in the
written statement. Relying on Rainey, defendant argued that this
examination was "tantamount" to offering the statement into evidence
and that he could thus require the prosecution to introduce any other

38.
39.

Id.
Id.

40. FED. R. EvID. 106.
41. 784 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1986), affd en banc, 827 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1987), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
42. 784 F.2d at 1529-30.
43. Id. at 1529 n.11. For a fuller discussion of Rainey, see Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence,
39 MERCER L. REV. 1259, 1262-63 (1988).
44. 166 F.3d 1106 (11th Cir. 1999).

2000]

EVIDENCE

1171

portions of the statement that were favorable to him.45 The Eleventh
Circuit disagreed.46 In his examination the prosecutor never referred
to the written statement.47 "Because the prosecutor questioned the
agent only about what [defendant] said rather than about what was
written in the document, Rule 106 did not apply."48 Under RamirezPerez, if the jury is never informed that a document or recorded
statement exists, then Rule 106 can never apply.

III. ARTICLE IV: RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
The broad discretion afforded district judges in evidentiary determinations is perhaps most apparent in matters of relevancy. The decisions
of district courts determining relevancy, as the Eleventh Circuit has
noted, should be affirmed "'even though we would have gone the other
way had it been our call.'"4 9 However, the Eleventh Circuit determined
in United States v. Hands5 ° that the district court and the prosecutor
went too far.5 Defendant's wife testified that her husband had been
at home full-time caring for her and their children during much of the
time when he had allegedly engaged in drug dealing. She also testified
that she had never seen her husband deal drugs. Defendant then took
the stand and testified in his own defense. On cross-examination the
prosecutor asked defendant about his use of firearms after the revocation
of his handgun permit. Defendant blamed the revocation on a personal
disagreement between him and the local sheriff. The prosecutor then
embarked on a line of questions suggesting that defendant's handgun
permit was revoked because he had beaten his wife. The district court
overruled defendant's repeated objections to this line of questioning
because, the court concluded, the testimony was inconsistent with the
wife's testimony. The district court even admitted photographs allegedly
showing the wife's injuries from the beatings. Defendant denied any
connection between the allegations of spousal abuse and the revocation
of his handgun permit. Eventually, the prosecutor left the subject and
never offered any evidence demonstrating that defendant's handgun

45. Id. at 1111, 1113.
46. Id. at 1113.
47. Id. at 1112.
48. Id. at 1113.
49. United States v. Williams, 51 F.3d 1004, 1010 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting In re
Rasburg, 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994)).
50. 184 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999).
51. Id. at 1327.
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permit had been revoked because of charges stemming from spousal
abuse. 2
In an opinion highly critical of the prosecutor, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed defendant's conviction because of the admission of irrelevant
evidence.5" The reason for the revocation of defendant's handgun
permit, whatever it might have been, was not relevant to the charges
against him.54 Nor was the evidence relevant to impeach the wife's
testimony because nothing she said conflicted with evidence that her
husband had beaten her.5 Contrary to the district court's conclusion,
the wife did not present herself as a dutiful spouse. 6 Finally, the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the government's argument that the evidence
was relevant because it suggested that defendant had lied concerning
the reasons for the revocation of his handgun permit.5 7 Acknowledging
that otherwise irrelevant evidence may be admissible to impeach a
witness's relevant testimony, the court noted that the entire line of
questioning was irrelevant and that "the government could not
bootstrap irrelevant evidence into the trial by using it to impeach the
answers to irrelevant questions."58
Moreover, even if evidence of defendant's spousal abuse was relevant,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court should have
excluded the evidence under Rule 403." 9 Rule 403 requires the
exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury."' As noted in previous surveys, Rule 403 was
once frequently used by the Eleventh Circuit to reverse criminal
convictions. However, consistent with its dramatic lowering of the level
of scrutiny on evidentiary issues, Rule 403 is now rarely a factor in
appellate decisions. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit in Hands made clear
that Rule 403 is an "'extraordinary remedy"'6 1 and "carries a 'strong
presumption in favor of admissibility."'6 2 However, the court reasoned

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
1996)).
62.

Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1334-35.
Id. at 1327.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1327-28.
Id. at 1328.
Id.
FED. R. EvID. 403.
184 F.3d at 1328 (quoting United States v. Utter, 97 F.3d 509, 514 (11th Cir.
Id. (quoting United States v. Church, 955 F.2d 688, 703 (11th Cir. 1992)).
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that evidence of spousal abuse in a drug trial was so prejudicial that
Rule 403 should be invoked.6
Rule 404 is the principal rule of evidence governing the admissibility
of "extrinsic act evidence," or evidence of acts and transactions other
than the one at issue. Rule 404 is primarily intended to bar the
introduction of propensity evidence, or evidence of prior misconduct
offered to prove that a party is more likely to have engaged in the
conduct at issue because he engaged in the prior misconduct. Although
extrinsic act evidence is not admissible to prove a party's propensity to
engage in misconduct, it is admissible "for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident. " 64 Extrinsic act evidence is a favorite
weapon of prosecutors. For example, prosecutors frequently introduce
evidence of a defendant's prior drug conviction to prove his intent to
commit a subsequent drug offense. Like Rule 403, Rule 404 was once a
frequent subject of Eleventh Circuit decisions, but now is seldom
mentioned by the Eleventh Circuit, much less used to reverse convictions.
During the current survey period, Rule 404(b) played a significant role
in only one decision, United States v. Marshall.65 In Marshall the
Government successfully tendered evidence that defendants previously
had been arrested on drug charges when they were found by police in a
house containing crack cocaine production paraphernalia. However,
these charges were later dismissed because there was no evidence
connecting defendants to drug production. The Government contended
that these prior arrests were relevant to prove defendants' intent to
engage in the drug activity that led to the current charges against
them." The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that intent to commit a
charged offense can be proved by evidence of prior criminal activity
when the same intent was required."7 As a threshold matter, however,
the court noted that the prosecutor must prove that a defendant
committed the extrinsic offense.68 In this case the prosecutor merely
proved that defendants were only arrested for prior similar offenses.6 9

63. Id.
64. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
65. 173 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 1999).

66. Id. at 1317.
67. Id. at 1317-18.

68. Id.
69. Id.
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The court held this evidence was insufficient to prove that they
committed those offenses.7 °
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Matthews 71 is
notable not because it broke new ground, but rather because of its clear
statement on the relationship between Rules 404 and 608. In Matthews
defendants claimed the district court wrongly prohibited them from
cross-examining a government witness about a prior arrest. After the
witness testified that she cooperated with the prosecutors because they
promised to enroll her in a drug rehabilitation program, defendants
attempted to use evidence of her prior arrest to demonstrate that
criminal charges against the witness had been dropped in exchange for
her cooperation. However, there was no evidence of any connection
between the dropping of the charges and the witness's cooperation with
the Government.72 The Eleventh Circuit's succinct analysis of defendants' claim merits quotation in full:
Federal Rule of Evidence 405 [sic] generally prohibits the use of
specific prior acts as proof of character to show action in conformity
with a character trait evidenced by the behavior. Evidence of prior
conduct may, however, be used as circumstantial evidence of a noncharacter issue, such as motive, intent, opportunity, knowledge, or
other issues material to the charge. Where impeachment is concerned,
Rule 608(b) provides that the trial court may in its discretion permit
questioning about a witness' prior bad acts on cross-examination, if the
acts bear on the witness' character for truthfulness. If the witness
denies the conduct, such acts may not be proved by extrinsic evidence
and the questioning party must take the witness' answer, unless the
evidence would be otherwise admissible as bearing on a material issue
of the case.73
The Eleventh Circuit held that the witness's prior arrest was not
relevant to a material issue and that Rule 404 was thus inapplicable.74

Regarding impeachment pursuant to Rule 608, the court found that
docket sheets allegedly documenting the witness's arrest were inadmissi-

ble because Rule 608 prohibited the use of extrinsic evidence to prove

70. Id. Although not mentioned by the Eleventh Circuit, it is not necessary that the
prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt or even by clear and convincing evidence that
a defendant committed an extrinsic act. The prosecution need only produce evidence
sufficient to allow a juror reasonably to conclude that the act occurred and that the
defendant was the actor. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687 (1988).
71. 168 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 1999).
72. Id. at 1243-44.
73. Id. at 1244 (citations omitted).
74. Id.
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prior incidents of conduct.75 Additionally, with regard to questions
about the prior arrest, the Government produced sufficient evidence to
permit the district court, in its discretion, to bar cross-examination about
the arrest because prosecutors established that the arrest had never
taken place and that the docket sheets were in error.76
If character evidence is admissible for substantive, as opposed to
impeachment, purposes, Rule 405 provides the methods of proving
character. In criminal cases the prosecutor may cross-examine a
defendant's character witness regarding the witness's knowledge of
specific prior acts committed by the defendant. Such questions are
sometimes called "have you heard" questions because the prosecution can
ask the witness whether he was aware that the defendant had committed an act of misconduct to show that the witness's opinion of the
defendant's character is suspect, either because he was unaware of the
prior misconduct or because he has a favorable impression of the
defendant's character notwithstanding his knowledge of the misconduct.77 However, the prosecutor cannot ask questions that effectively
assume the defendant's guilt of the charges against him. For example,
in United States v. Guzman,7" the Eleventh Circuit held the district
court improperly allowed the prosecutor to cross-examine defendant's
character witness with guilt-assuming questions. 79 The court considered whether this error was subject to harmful error analysis.8 0 The
court concluded that "using guilt-assuming hypotheticals [is not] error
so grave as to be beyond harmless error analysis."8 ' The court then
concluded that the error was, in fact, harmless.8 2
IV.

ARTICLE V PRIVILEGES

The Federal Rules of Evidence do not define various evidentiary
privileges, but rather provide that the federal judiciary may formulate
rules governing privileges in nondiversity cases. In diversity cases state
law determines the existence of privileges.

75. Id. at 1243-44.
76. Id.
77. See United States v. Collins, 779 F.2d 1520, 1532 (11th Cir. 1986); see also

Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477-82 (1948).
78. 167 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1999).

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1354.
1352-53.
1352.
1354.
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In Hicks v. Talbott Recovery System, Inc.,8 the Eleventh Circuit
interpreted Georgia's "absolute privilege" for communications between
a psychiatrist or psychologist and a patient. Defendants, without
plaintiff's authorization or in excess of plaintiff's authorization, released
records of plaintiff's treatment for alcohol, drug, and sex addiction to the
Texas State Board of Medical Examiners. Plaintiff, a physician, had
undergone treatment for his addictions at the insistence of his employer
after a patient smelled alcohol on his breath. Although plaintiff
provided defendants with limited authority to release some of his
records, defendants released virtually all records of his treatment. As
a result the Texas Board of Medical Examiners imposed restrictions on
plaintiff's return to practice that prevented him from returning to work
with his employer. The only medical employment plaintiff was able to
find was at a prison 150 miles from his home.8
Contending that defendants' release of his records was unauthorized,
plaintiff sued defendants, and the jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's
favor. On appeal defendants argued that because plaintiff signed a
release relating to his therapy, the trial court should have granted their
motion for judgment as a matter of law. Apparently, defendants
contended that the authorization to release some of the records resulted
in a waiver of the privileged nature of all the records.8 5 To resolve this
issue, the court undertook a detailed review of Georgia law governing
communications between a psychiatrist or psychologist and a patient.8 8
First, the records are not privileged unless the patient voluntarily sought
therapy.8 7 According to the court, this requirement was satisfied
because although plaintiff was required to undergo therapy, he was
allowed to choose the institutions for his therapy." The court then
noted that the psychiatrist/psychologist-patient privilege is held in high
regard by Georgia law, and communications arising from the relationship are absolutely privileged unless waived. 9 Waiver of the privilege
requires "'some express intentional act to do so."'

83.

196 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1999).

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1229-36.
1236.
1236-39.
1238.

88. Id. at 1239-40.
89. Id. at 1238; see al8o O.C.G.A. § 23-2-58 (1982). The court also noted that the
relationship between a patient and his psychologist or psychiatrist constitutes a
confidential relationship under Georgia law. 196 F.3d at 1238.
90. 196 F.3d at 1238 (quoting Jones v. Abel, 209 Ga. App. 889, 890, 434 S.E.2d 822,
824 (1993)). The requirement of clear evidence of waiver was recently reinforced by a fullcourt decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals. Hopson v. Kennestone Hosp., Inc., 241 Ga.
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The court then addressed the protection afforded psychiatric and
psychological records and concluded that Georgia law likewise protects
such records.91 Again, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion is interesting for
what it does not say. Psychiatric records, as opposed to communications,
are not absolutely privileged under Georgia law.92 The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that plaintiff did not waive the psychiatrist/psychologist-patient privilege and did not authorize the release of
his therapy records to the extent defendants released them.93
V. ARTICLE VII: OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 4 loomed again like a
specter over the Eleventh Circuit. The Supreme Court's two most recent
Daubert decisions, General Electric Co. v. Joiner5 and Kumho Tire Co.
v. Carmichael," have come at the expense of the Eleventh Circuit, a
fact that appeared to be painfully apparent to the Eleventh Circuit
during the survey period. 7 The long-standing test for the admissibility
of expert testimony established in Frye v. United States"8 was held to
be supplanted by the Federal Rules of Evidence in Daubert. 9 The
Court in Daubertassigned to district courts a "gatekeeping" function for
assessing the admissibility of expert testimony."°
Since Daubert,
circuit and district judges have struggled mightily to fashion a framework for the analysis of expert testimony. During the current survey
period, the Eleventh Circuit rendered its most detailed Daubertanalysis
yet.

App. 829, 831, 526 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1999).
91. 196 F.3d at 1238-39.
92. See Dynin v. Hall, 207 Ga. App. 337, 338, 428 S.E.2d 89, 90 (1993).
93. 196 F.3d at 1244.
94. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
95. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
96. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
97. The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit in both Joiner,522 U.S. at 147,
and, during the current survey period, in Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158. In Kumho Tire the
Supreme Court held that Daubert applies to all expert testimony and is not limited to
"scientific" testimony. Id. at 147-49. The Court also held that all four Daubert factors
(testing, peer review, error rates, and scientific acceptability) need not be satisfied for
expert testimony to be admissible. Id. at 149-50. Rather, district courts, in performing
their gatekeeping analysis of the reliability of expert testimony, are entitled to great
flexibility, and the scope and nature of their inquiry will be determined by the particular
facts of each case. Id. at 151-53.
98. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
99. 509 U.S. at 587.
100. Id. at 589 n.7.
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In Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp.,' °' plaintiff sought to recover for
injuries allegedly caused by her silicone breast implants. After a threeday "Dauberthearing," the district court concluded that plaintiff's expert
testimony on causation was inadmissible. Because plaintiff could not
prove causation without this evidence, the district court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment. °2
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit first noted the standard for the
admission of scientific expert testimony.'l3 Such evidence is admissible if (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the
subject matter of his testimony, (2) the expert's methodology is
sufficiently reliable, and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."° However,
the court noted that the Daubert analysis "does not operate in a
vacuum," and thus defendants in Allison also challenged plaintiff's
expert testimony on the basis of Rules 401, 402, 403, 702, and 703.105
The court's reference to Rules 401, 402, and 403, all of which deal with
the admission of relevant evidence, is interesting. The court acknowledged that Rules 401 and 402 favor the liberal admission of evidence. 10 6 Rule 403, on the other hand, permits a court to exclude
relevant evidence "'if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.' " 10 7 As discussed above the
Eleventh Circuit no longer aggressively uses Rule 403 to exclude
evidence. Indeed, Rule 403, as noted, is an extraordinary remedy that
"carries a 'strong presumption in favor of admissibility.'" 0 8 In the case
of expert evidence, however, the Eleventh Circuit appears to be taking
a different approach. Rule 403, the court said in Allison, plays an
"intricate role... in an expert testimony admissibility analysis" because
of the potential influential impact of expert testimony.0 9 Thus, the
court noted, Rule 403 is of particular relevance in the analysis of expert
testimony."0 The Eleventh Circuit's detour into Rule 403 analysis is

101.
102.
103.
104.

184 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1306.
Id. at 1309.
Id.

105.

Id.

106. Id.
107. Id. at 1310 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403).
108. United States v. Hands, 184 F.3d 1322, 1328 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting United
States v. Church, 955 F.2d 688, 703 (11th Cir. 1992)).
109. 184 F.3d at 1310.
110. Id.
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even more interesting because of the fact that the district court did not
rely on Rule 403. Nevertheless, the court felt it necessary to note that
Rule 403 buttressed the district court's exclusion of plaintiff's expert
evidence."' It seems that the Eleventh Circuit wanted to make a
point, and the point is that general principles of relevancy do not apply
to expert evidence. Rather, such evidence must satisfy a stricter
standard, and Rule 403 alone can be used to exclude expert evidence.
With that the court turned to the district court's Daubert analysis.
First, the court discussed the gatekeeper status imposed on district
judges by Daubert, a role that often leads to intensive and extensive
evaluation of expert evidence."'2 The court acknowledged that such
meticulous Daubert inquiries may bring judges under criticism for
donning white coats and making determinations that are outside their
field of expertise, [but] the Supreme Court has obviously deemed this
less objectionable than dumping a barrage of questionable scientific
evidence on a jury, who would likely be even less equipped than the
judge to make reliability and relevance determinations and more likely
than the judge to be awestruck by the expert's mystique. 13'
As it began its analysis, the court noted "in passing" that other district
courts evaluating scientific evidence in breast implant litigation had
commissioned panels of experts and used court-appointed technical
advisors who concluded that there was no reliable evidence that silicone
breast implants caused
injuries, but the court claimed not to have relied
11 4
on those conclusions.
Daubert suggests four factors that should be considered by district
judges in their gatekeeper roles when determining whether expert
evidence is reliable. First, the court should consider whether the theory
or technique used by the expert can be tested.'15 Second, the court
should consider whether the theory or technique has been subjected to
peer review. 8 Third, the court should consider whether the technique
has a high potential rate of error.117 Finally, the court should consider
whether the theory has attained general acceptance within the relevant
scientific community."8 However, these factors are not exhaustive,
and the court in Allison noted that the general thrust of Daubert

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
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117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1311.
509 U.S. at 593.
Id. at 593-94.
Id. at 594.
Id.
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analysis is to prove that the evidence at issue is reliable.119 In this
regard plaintiff argued that the Eleventh Circuit had long favored the
liberal admission of expert evidence. 2 In response, the court noted
plaintiff had failed to appreciate "the fact that this Circuit has been
twice overruled on Daubertdecisions in precedent setting Supreme Court
decisions in Joiner and Kumho Tire, both of which imposed stricter
standards than the Eleventh Circuit had deemed appropriadmissibility
121
ate."

If the proper scientific evidence is "reliable," Daubert next requires
that the evidence be relevant within the context of Rule 702; thus, the
evidence must have a valid scientific connection to the disputed facts at
the Eleventh Circuit noted, has been
issue. 122 This connection,
12 3
referred to as "fit."
The Eleventh Circuit then began a detailed examination of the district
court's intensive evaluation of the three experts' opinions. For example,
noting that one expert relied on studies performed with animals, the
court concluded that plaintiff "does not explain why the results of these
animal studies should trump more than twenty controlled epidemiological studies of breast implants in humans which have found no valid
increase risk of autoimmune disease." 124 Another expert's opinion was
based on "unreliable methodology."125 For present purposes, it is
sufficient to note that the district court's and the Eleventh Circuit's
analyses were, to put it mildly, rigorous. The Eleventh Circuit was not
sanguine about the effects of such thorough analysis on a wide scale
basis:
"We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no
matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from
learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is
the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the
exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized
resolution of legal disputes." 26
Perhaps in an effort to make another point, the Eleventh Circuit
repeatedly noted its disagreement with various aspects of the district

119. 184 F.3d at 1312.

120. Id.
121. Id.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

509 U.S. at 591-92.
184 F.3d at 1312.
Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1316.
Id. at 1322 (quoting Daubert,509 U.S. at 597).
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court's analysis and conclusions.' 27 The fact that the Eleventh Circuit
thought the district court wrong, however, did not mean the district
court had abused its discretion. 12
One's opinion on such rigorous Daubert analysis no doubt will be
shaped by whether one is likely to reap the rewards or suffer the injury
of such analysis. What seems clear, however, is that the Eleventh
Circuit, having been rebuffed by the Supreme Court in its prior
significant Daubertdecisions, has now embraced such rigorous examination. Perhaps more significantly, the Eleventh Circuit appears ready to
defer to district court Daubert determinations to the point that it can
reasonably be asked whether there is any meaningful appellate review.
Indeed, according to counsel for plaintiff in Allison, one judge asked at
oral argument whether, in view of the Supreme Court's decision in
Joiner,there were any district court Daubertdeterminations that could
be reversed on appeal. A good question.
The Eleventh Circuit's Daubert analysis was much more cursory in
United States v. Paul.' In Paul defendant contended that Daubert
should have barred the admissibility of testimony by a handwriting
expert, arguing that handwriting analysis does not qualify as reliable
After noting the Daubert framework, the
scientific research. 3 '
Eleventh Circuit discussed what had been a split among the circuits over
whether Daubert applied to nonscientific expert testimony. 131 This
split was resolved by the Supreme Court in Kumho 7re Co., which made
clear that Daubert applies to all expert testimony. 132 However, the
Eleventh Circuit said that the Supreme Court in Kumho Tire Co.
acknowledged that an expert witness, pursuant to Rule 702 and 703, is
given leeway unavailable to other witnesses because the expert's opinion
testimony "'will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience
of his discipline.'"" The Daubert analysis, the court continued, is a
flexible analysis, and the district court need not necessarily apply each
and every Daubert factor in its analysis. 34 Furthermore, the district
court's determination is subject to the abuse-of-discretion standard of
review..35 Although the Eleventh Circuit concluded that defendant's
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Id.
Id.
175 F.3d 906 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 535 (1999).
175 F.3d at 909.
Id. at 910.
526 U.S. at 147-49.
175 F.3d at 910 (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 148).
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Daubert-based argument was without merit, it never said
why.138 It
137
merely outlined in truncated form the Daubert analysis.
Similarly, in United States v. Majors,"8 the Eleventh Circuit held
that the district court properly allowed an FBI financial analyst to
testify, based on his analysis of defendants' documents and his opinion
that defendants defrauded investors of $3.3 million, even though the
district court did not hold a Daubert hearing and the analyst was not a
certified public accountant. 39
In United States v. Marshall," the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
permissible use of opinion testimony by lay witnesses.'" In Marshall
defendants' counsel established on cross-examination of a Drug
Enforcement Agency agent that the Agency's informant had three
separate sources of cocaine. The point was to establish doubt whether
the cocaine at issue was obtained from defendants. On redirect
examination, the district court allowed the prosecutor to ask the agent
whether he believed the cocaine came from a source other than
defendants."
The Eleventh Circuit held this was error.'
While a
lay witness may opine with regard to matters of which he has firsthand
knowledge, such as knowledge about whether a car was speeding or
whether a person was drunk, the agent was not present at the cocaine
transaction and thus did not have any firsthand knowledge as to where
the cocaine came from.'" The court held that this was not proper lay
opinion testimony. 45
The prosecutor next contended that this testimony was admissible
because defendants had impeached the informant's credibility.and thus
the Government, pursuant to Rule 608(a)(2), should have been allowed
to rehabilitate the informant's credibility.'" The Eleventh Circuit
acknowledged that defendants had attacked the informant's credibility,
but posing the question to the agent was not the proper way to
rehabilitate that credibility.'47 Asking the agent whether he believed
that the informant received the cocaine from defendants was a question

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 910-11.
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Id. at 1215-16.
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intended to establish a fact and not to bolster the informant's credibility."' Accordingly, the court reversed defendants' convictions.149
VI. ARTICLE VIII: HEARSAY
In criminal cases the use of hearsay evidence against an accused
potentially raises constitutional issues; if an out-of-court statement is
admitted into evidence, then the defendant will not "be confronted with
the witnesses against him." 5 ° In Ohio v. Roberts,..' the Supreme
Court held that the Sixth Amendment imposes two limitations on the
use of hearsay evidence against an accused.5 2 First, hearsay evidence
is not admissible unless the prosecutor proves the declarant is unavailable."5 Second, the hearsay statement must bear "adequate 'indicia
of reliability."""' However, in United States v. Inadi,'55 the Supreme
Court concluded that Roberts does not stand for the blanket proposition
that "no out-of-court statement can be introduced.., without a showing
that the declarant is unavailable."'56 In Inadi the Court held that the
Confrontation Clause does not require a showing of unavailability as a
prerequisite to the admission of a coconspirator's statement under Rule
801(d)(2)(E). 157 The Supreme Court returned to this issue in Idaho v.
Wright.l " In Wright the out-of-court declarant, a child, was unavailable to testify. Therefore, the issue was whether the out-of-court
statement satisfied the reliability requirement of the second prong of the
Roberts test. Roberts suggested, and the Supreme Court later confirmed,
that the requisite indicia of reliability can be found if the evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.'59 In Wright the lower court
admitted the out-of-court statement under Idaho's residual exception to
the hearsay rule, an exception that the Supreme Court concluded was
not sufficiently firmly rooted to establish automatically the requisite
reliability. 160 Therefore, the circumstances surrounding the statement
had to be examined to determine if the statement was sufficiently
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trustworthy. Significantly, the Court noted that the reliability of the
statement could not be established by corroborating evidence, but rather
the statement "must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent
trustworthiness.""'
The Supreme Court next addressed the tension between hearsay
evidence and the Confrontation Clause in White v. Illinois."2 In White
the trial court admitted testimony from several witnesses concerning
statements made by a child who allegedly had been sexually molested
by defendant. These statements were admitted pursuant to Illinois'
hearsay exceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements made
in the course of securing medical treatment."6 The Supreme Court
first addressed whether it was necessary to demonstrate the child's
unavailability. The Court acknowledged that its decision in Roberts
suggested that the Confrontation Clause generally requires proof of the
declarant's unavailability.'
However, the Court concluded that
Roberts should be limited to its facts; thus, a showing of unavailability
must be made only when hearsay is admitted pursuant to an exception
for statements made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding, the
hearsay exception at issue in Roberts.' 65 The hearsay exceptions at
issue in White, the Court held, do not require a showing of unavailability. 6
The Court then held that the exceptions for spontaneous
declarations and statements made in connection with obtaining medical
treatment are sufficiently firmly established to be automatically
admissible.'67
The Supreme Court's most recent examination of the conflict between
hearsay evidence and the Confrontation Clause occurred during the
current survey period. In Lilly v. Virginia,"6 the Court addressed the
issue of whether defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated
when the trial court admitted evidence of a statement by defendant's
brother. Under police questioning the brother admitted his involvement
in criminal activity with defendant, but claimed that defendant was
more culpable. When the brother refused to testify at defendant's trial,
the trial court admitted the brother's statements as declarations against
penal interest. 6 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
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whether defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront his witnesses
"was violated by admitting into evidence at his trial a nontestifying
accomplice's entire confession that contained some statements against
the accomplice's penal interest and others that inculpated the accused." 7 ° After a detailed examination of the origin of the hearsay
exception for statements against penal interest, the Court held that an
accomplice's confession that inculpates a criminal defendant is not
within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. 7' Thus, whether
the prosecutor seeks to admit an accomplice's statement under the
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest, or any other
hearsay exception, the Sixth Amendment bars its admission unless the
prosecutor can prove the reliability and trustworthiness of the statement.
In Macuba v. DeBoer,'7 2 the Eleventh Circuit attempted to dispel the
"apparent confusion in the federal courts on the extent to which hearsay
may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." 73
Whether it succeeded remains undetermined. In Macuba plaintiff
brought suit against a Florida county and two members of its Board of
Commissioners for infringement of his First Amendment rights. The
county commissioners moved for summary judgment on the ground that
they were immune from suit under the doctrines of absolute and
qualified immunity. When the district court denied their motion, the
commissioners appealed. In response to defendants' motion for summary
judgment, plaintiff relied on the affidavit of a former county commissioner recounting conversations between the former commissioner and a
number of county employees, at least one of whom held a supervisory
position.'7 4 The Eleventh Circuit dismissed this affidavit as "rank
hearsay," a problem apparently undetected by the district court.'
The Eleventh Circuit thought this was because of the confusion over
whether and to what extent hearsay is admissible in summary judgment
proceedings.7 " The general rule, the court noted, is that hearsay
cannot be considered by a trial court when ruling on summary judgment
motions.'
However, the court acknowledged that many circuits,
including the Eleventh Circuit, "appear to have restated the general rule
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to hold that a district court may consider a hearsay statement in passing
on a motion for summary judgment if the statement could be 'reduced to
admissible evidence at trial' or 'reduced to admissible form.'" 7 8 The
court traced these cases to the Supreme Court's decision in Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett,17 in which the Court held that a party responding to a
motion for summary judgment need not produce affidavits, but may rely
on pleadings and discovery on file with the court." Regardless of the
source, the Eleventh Circuit concluded in Macuba that the phrases
"reduced to admissible evidence in trial" and "reduced to admissible
form" do not mean that hearsay evidence is admissible in summary
judgment proceedings, but rather require that the out-of-court statements be admissible at trial for some purpose.18' Thus, the statement
at issue may be hearsay, but the district court may consider if it falls
within an exception to the hearsay rule. It appears that the court
concluded that the statement itself must be admissible at trial even
though the form of the statement considered by the district court in the
summary judgment proceeding is not admissible.' 82 For example, an
affidavit would not be admissible at trial. 183 Yet in a summary
judgment proceeding, the district court may consider an affidavit
recounting the hearsay statement of a declarant that falls within an
exception to the rule against hearsay, but may not consider an affidavit
recounting a hearsay statement not covered by an exception."M But
this is almost always the case; rarely do district courts hear live
testimony when ruling on summary judgment motions. Instead they
rely on affidavits, deposition transcripts, or similar written forms of
testimony. Under the majority's holding, the testimony contained in
such documents must itself be admissible. In other words, the question
is whether the hearsay statement in an affidavit would be admissible if
the affiant were testifying "live" in court rather than by affidavit.
If this is the majority's holding, it arguably does not address squarely
the issue before the court. It would appear that the phrases "reduced to
admissible evidence at trial" and "reduced to admissible form," if they
mean anything, must stand for something more than the simple

178. Id. at 1323 (quoting Pritchard v. Southern Co. Servs., 92 F.3d 1130, 1135 (11th
Cir. 1996)).
179. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
180. Id. at 323.
181. 193 F.3d at 1323-24.
182. See id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1323-25.
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proposition that affidavits can be considered even though affidavits
would be inadmissible at trial.
This seemed to be Judge Bright's point in his dissent. He noted that
the hearsay statements in the affidavit "may well have represented
admissible employee statements, or may otherwise be provable or
admissible at trial by the individual making the statement. However,
the record remains incomplete on foundation and the manner in which
this evidence would be presented at trial."185 Thus, in Judge Bright's
opinion, a hearsay statement in an affidavit may nevertheless be
admissible even though there is not yet a sufficient foundation in the
record to bring the statement within some exception to the rule against
hearsay. With regard to the evidence at issue, Judge Bright concluded
that this evidence was sufficient, at the summary judgment stage, to
create a genuine issue of material fact."'

185. Id. at 1327 (Bright, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
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